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Abstract
In this paper, we derive a linear-quadratic model for monetary policy analysis that is
consistent with sticky prices and search and matching frictions in the labor market. We show
that the second-order approximation to the welfare of the representative agent depends on in-
ﬂation and “gaps” that involve current and lagged unemployment. Our approximation makes
explicit how the costs of ﬂuctuations are generated by the presence of search frictions. These
costs are distinct from the costs associated with relative price dispersion and ﬂuctuations in
consumption that appear in standard new Keynesian models. We use the model to analyze
optimal monetary policy under commitment and discretion and to show that the structural
characteristics of the labor market have important implications for optimal policy.
JEL: E52, E58, J64
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
The canonical new Keynesian model is based on the assumption of monopolistic competition
among individual ﬁrms together with the imposition of staggered price setting. However, the basic
new Keynesian model assumes that there is no unemployment. With sticky prices but ﬂexible
wages, the real wage and the marginal rate of substitution between leisure and consumption move
together, implying that households are supplying the amount of hours that maximize their utility,
given the real wage. Workers are never unemployed and only hours worked per worker vary over
the business cycle. As a consequence, the basic new Keynesian model cannot shed light on how
unemployment varies over time, how it aﬀects welfare, or whether monetary policy should respond
to the unemployment rate.
In contrast to this standard view of labor input, empirical evidence suggests that, at business
cycle frequencies, most variation of labor input occurs at the extensive margin. Figure 1 shows
HP-ﬁltered log hours per employee and the log number of employees for U.S. total private in-
dustries. In periods of below trend output, employed workers work fewer hours, but also fewer
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1workers are employed. During periods of above trend output, employed workers work longer hours
but also more workers are employed. Employment is much more volatile than hours, with the
variance of detrended employment almost eight times larger than the variance of hours. These
ﬂuctuations in the fraction of workers actually employed reﬂect ﬂuctuations in unemployment
and are quantitatively larger than the ﬂuctuations in hours that standard new Keynesian models
treat as the sole of source of labor variation.1
In this paper, we show how a new Keynesian model with sticky prices and search-based
unemployment can be reduced to a linear Phillips Curve relationship between inﬂation and un-
employment, expected future unemployment, and lagged unemployment. The coeﬃcients in the
Phillips curve depend on the underlying structural parameters of the model that govern prefer-
ences, the degree of nominal price rigidity, and the search and bargaining processes in the labor
market. Our objective is to explore the policy implications of this unemployment-based Phillips
Curve.
To carry out this exploration, we derive a second-order approximation to the welfare of the
representative household and show how it depends on inﬂation and the gap between unemployment
and the eﬃcient level of unemployment. We show that labor market tightness aﬀects welfare, and
all the cost from search ineﬃciency can be summarized in a single term in the welfare function.
In our economy, the ﬁrst best is attained when both inﬂation and the unemployment gap are
equal to zero. Given the linear representation of the structural equations and a model-consistent
quadratic loss function, the model can be used to study monetary policy issues in the same way
the standard new Keynesian Phillips Curve has been used. The framework allows for stochastic
ineﬃciencies that distort the ﬂexible-price equilibrium. This introduces a third distortion (the
other two being monopolistic competition and sticky prices) that is absent from standard new
Keynesian models.2
Some of the monetary policy implications of standard new Keynesian models are preserved
when search frictions and unemployment are added. For example, productivity shocks do not
generate a trade-oﬀ between inﬂation and the unemployment rate gap, but such shocks do require
movements in unemployment and real activity. At the same time the volatility of unemployment
over the business cycle, beside aﬀecting the goals of the policy maker, changes the monetary
transmission mechanism by adding a cost channel for the interest rate along with the traditional
demand channel.3
A growing number of papers have incorporated the extensive margin and unemployment into
new Keynesian models. Examples include Chéron and Langot (1999), Walsh (2003, 2005), Alex-
opoulos (2004), Christoﬀel, Kuester, and Linzert (2006), Blanchard and Galí (2006), Krause and
Lubik (2007), Barnichon (2006), Thomas (2008), Gertler and Trigari (2006), Gertler, Sala, and
Trigari (2007), Krause, Lubik, and Lopéz-Salido (2007), Ravenna and Walsh (2008a, 2008b), Sala,
Söderström, and Trigari (2008), and Trigari (2009). The focus of these earlier contributions has
extended from exploring the implications for macro dynamics in calibrated models to the estima-
1This statement applies to new Keynesian models with sticky wages as well as to those with ﬂexible wages. It
also applies to most RBC models.
2Ravenna and Walsh (2008b) discuss how each of the distortions in models with staggered price setting and
labor market frictions aﬀects the trade-oﬀs faced by monetary policy.
3While we focus on optimal policy, the implications for simple Taylor rules are also aﬀe c t e db yt h ep r e s e n c eo f
labor market frictions. For example, the conditions for determinacy do not generally satisfy the so-called Taylor
principle. See Kurozumi and Van Zandweghe (2008) for an analysis of determinacy in a sticky price, labor search
model that is quite similar in structure to the model we develop here and in Ravenna and Walsh (2008a).
2tion of DSGE models with labor market frictions. For example, Sala, Söderström, and Trigari
(2008) evaluate monetary policy trade-oﬀs and optimal policy in an estimated model with search
and matching frictions in the labor market, but they use an ad hoc quadratic loss function rather
than the model consistent welfare approximation we derive.
The papers closest in motivation to ours are Blanchard and Galí (2008) and Thomas (2008).
Both these papers make speciﬁc assumptions on how the wage setting process generates ineﬃcient
ﬂuctuations of the surplus share assigned to each party. Our approach does not take a stand on
the sources of these ﬂuctuations, and instead assumes they are exogenous. Thus, no endogenous
constraint aﬀects wage adjustment, exactly as in the standard new Keynesian model.
Thomas (2008) incorporates convex costs of posting vacancies and staggered real wage adjust-
ment, and derives a quadratic welfare approximation. Losses are generated by the interaction of
nonlinear vacancy posting costs, real wage dispersion and ineﬃcient hiring. The welfare function
he derives depends on a term that compounds these diﬀerent distortions, expressed as a function
of log-deviations from the steady state. We maintain the assumption of linear vacancy posting
costs, as is more standard in the search and matching literature, and we allow real wages to be
ﬂexible. This permits us to obtain a quadratic approximation of the welfare function that is an
exact parallel with the basic new Keynesian model without search frictions. We are able, then,
to express the welfare function in terms of variables measuring gaps relative to the eﬃcient equi-
librium, providing a way to disaggregate the ineﬃciency created by the search from the standard
distortions due to nominal rigidity. We ﬁnd that this helps to provide new insights into the role
of search frictions.
Blanchard and Galí (henceforth BG) also develop a model to explore the implications of labor
market frictions for optimal monetary policy in a linear-quadratic framework where the policy
maker loss function is derived as an approximation to the households’ welfare. BG share with our
paper the goal of developing a simple framework akin to the basic new Keynesian model but in
which unemployment plays a central role. In contrast to the Mortensen-Pissarides search model
we employ, BG assume ﬁrms face hiring costs that are increasing in the degree of labor market
tightness (measured as new hires relative to unemployment).
There are several signiﬁcant diﬀerences in the speciﬁcations of the BG model and ours, and
these aﬀect the issues the alternative models are best able to address. BG assume oﬀsetting
income and substitution eﬀects on labor supply, implying unemployment remains constant in the
face of productivity shocks when prices are ﬂexible. This implies that monetary policy should
focus on stabilizing the level of unemployment, as well as inﬂation. Our model allows unem-
ployment to ﬂuctuate under ﬂexible prices, but because productivity causes the eﬃcient level
of unemployment to ﬂuctuate, the appropriate objective of policy is deﬁn e di nt e r m so fa nu n -
employment rate gap that is more comparable to the output gap that appears in standard new
Keynesian models. In addition, the search and matching framework is, in our view, better able
to link labor market characteristics to macroeconomic behavior than the hiring costs approach
used by BG. For example, the roles of vacancies, job turnover, unemployment beneﬁts, and job-
ﬁnding probabilities are explicit in our model, which also generates endogenously a Beveridge
curve. The welfare approximation in BG also relies on the assumption that hiring costs are of
second order magnitude, an assumption we can dispense with. Finally, BG and Thomas (2008)
generate monetary policy trade-oﬀs by assuming real wage rigidity. Instead, we assume stochastic
3ﬂuctuations in worker-ﬁrm bargaining shares and ﬂexible real wages. This shock turns out to play
the same role as the cost-push shock in the new Keynesian model. This can also be interpreted
as deviations of the real wage from its eﬃcient level and so captures some of the same eﬀects
generated by assuming real wage rigidity.
In a basic new Keynesian model, cost-push shocks can lead to large losses if the central bank
pursues a single-minded focus on price stability. We ﬁn d ,h o w e v e r ,t h a ti fc o s t - p u s hs h o c k sa r e
reﬂective of random deviations of the surplus labor’s share from the eﬃcient level, and ﬁrms face
hiring costs, price stability is nearly optimal.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the basic model, derives a
log-linearized version of the model, and discusses the connections between labor market structure
and the Phillip curve. The ﬂexible-price, eﬃcient equilibrium is discussed in section 3. The
model-consistent welfare approximation and optimal policy are studied in section 4. The impact
of labor market structure on optimal policy is investigated in section 5, while conclusions are
summarized in section 6.
2 The model economy
The model consists of households whose utility depends on the consumption of market and home
produced goods, wholesale-goods producing ﬁrms who employ labor and sell in a competitive
goods market, and retail ﬁrms who transform the wholesale good into diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods
sold to households in an environment of monopolistic competition. The labor market is charac-
terized by search frictions. Households members are either employed (in a match) or searching
for a new match. This means that we do not focus on labor force participation decisions. Retail
ﬁrms adjust prices according to a standard Calvo speciﬁcation. The modelling strategy of locating
labor market frictions in the wholesale sector where prices are ﬂexible and locating sticky prices
in the retail sector among ﬁrms who do not employ labor provides a convenient separation of the
two frictions in the model. A similar approach was adopted in Walsh (2003, 2005), Ravenna and
Walsh (2008a), Thomas (2008), and Trigari (2009).
2.1 Final goods
We begin with the description of the ﬁnal goods market.
2.1.1 Demand
The demand for the ﬁnal goods arises from two sources — households who purchase retail goods
to form a consumption bundle and wholesale ﬁrms who must employ real resources to recruit and
hire workers.
Households Households consist of a large number of members who can be either employed by
wholesale ﬁrms in production activities or unemployed. In the former case, they receive a market
real wage wt; in the latter case, they receive a ﬁxed amount wu of household production units.
As is standard in the literature on matching frictions, we assume that consumption risks are fully
pooled. Households maximize expected discounted utility which depends on total consumption
4of market goods Cm
t and home production wu(1 − Nt):
Ct = Cm
t + wu(1 − Nt),
where Nt is the number of household members employed during the period.
Market consumption is an aggregate of goods purchased from the continuum of retail ﬁrms
which produce diﬀerentiated ﬁnal goods. Preferences over the individual ﬁnal goods from ﬁrm j,

















The intertemporal ﬁrst order condition for the household’s decision problem yields the stan-
dard Euler equation:
λt = βEt{Rtλt+1},
where Rt is the gross return on an asset paying one unit of consumption aggregate in any state
of the world and λt is the marginal utility of consumption. Letting ˆ xt denote the log deviation
of a variable x around its steady-state value, we obtain the standard ﬁrst-order approximation
to the Euler condition implied by intertemporal optimization on the part of the representative
household:





(it − Etπt+1).( 2 )
Wholesale ﬁrms Final goods are also purchased by wholesale ﬁrms. We assume these ﬁrms
must pay a cost Ptκ for each job they post. Since job postings are homogenous with ﬁnal goods,
wholesale ﬁrms solve a static problem symmetric to the household’s one: they buy individual ﬁnal
goods vt(j) from each j ﬁnal-goods-producing retail ﬁrm so as to minimize total expenditure,

































t (j) ≡ Cm
t (j)+κvt(j) is total demand for ﬁnal good j.
2.1.2 Supply
Each retail ﬁrm purchases wholesale output at price Pw
t in a competitive market. The wholesale
good is then converted into a diﬀerentiated ﬁnal good sold to households and wholesale ﬁrms.
Retail ﬁrms maximize proﬁts subject to a CRS technology for converting wholesale goods into
ﬁnal goods, the demand functions (1) and (3a), and a restriction on the frequency with which
they can adjust their price.
Retail ﬁrms adjust prices according to the Calvo updating model. Each period a ﬁrm can
adjust its price with probability 1 − ω.R e t a i lﬁrms’ only input into production is the wholesale
goods, so each retail ﬁrm’s nominal marginal cost is Pw
t and all ﬁrms that adjust their price set
the same price. The real marginal cost for retail ﬁrms is the price of the wholesale good relative
to the price of ﬁnal output, Pw
t /Pt. This is just the inverse of the markup of retail over wholesale
goods. The markup will depend on the labor market frictions that characterize the wholesale
sector.

























t is aggregate demand for the ﬁnal goods basket. The standard pricing equation obtains
which, when linearized around a zero-inﬂation steady state yields the standard new Keynesian
Phillips curve:
πt = βEtπt+1 − δˆ μt,( 5 )





is the retail price markup.
2.1.3 Market clearing
Equations (2) and (5) are standard. The key diﬀerence between a model with labor market
frictions and a standard new Keynesian model is in the factors that aﬀect real marginal cost.
A second, less fundamental diﬀerence arises, as we discuss in section 2.2, because the real costs
6associated with posting job vacancies generates a wedge between consumption and output. Thus,
one cannot simply replace ˆ ct in (2) with an output measure. Instead, goods market clearing
requires that household consumption of market produced goods equals the output of the retail
sector minus ﬁnal goods purchased by wholesale ﬁrms to cover the costs of posting job vacancies
(see section 2.2). Hence, goods market equilibrium takes the form
Yt = Cm
t + κVt = Ct − wu (1 − Nt)+κVt,
where Vt is the aggregate number of vacancies posted and κ is the cost per vacancy. When











ˆ vt.( 6 )
The constant returns to scale technology for retail good’s production implies, when linearized,
that ˆ yt =ˆ nt + zt where ˆ n is employment and ˆ z is an aggregate productivity disturbance. Thus,

















2.2 Wholesale goods, employment and wages
The labor market is characterized by search frictions. Each period begins with Nt−1 existing
matches. There is an exogenous probability ρ that a match breaks up prior to producing output.
Those workers not in a match at the start of the period or who do not survive the exogenous
separation hazard seek new matches. Thus, the number of job seekers is
ut ≡ 1 − (1 − ρ)Nt−1.
Unemployed workers are matched stochastically with job vacancies. The matching process is




t ,( 8 )
where ut is the number of job seekers, vt is the number of posted job openings and 0 <α<1.4
Letting θt ≡ vt/ut measure of labor market tightness, mt = χθ
α
t ut. The number of matches that
produce in period t is
Nt =( 1− ρ)Nt−1 + m(ut,v t).
The linear approximations for the relationship between job seekers and matches and for the
evolution of employment are




ˆ nt−1 ≡− ηˆ nt−1.( 9 )
4We take the number of job seekers as our measure of unemployment and will so refer to ut.T h e s t a n d a r d
measure of unemployment would more closely match the number of workers not in a match at the end of the
period, 1 − Nt. The two are related since ut+1 =1− Nt + ρNt.
7and
ˆ nt =( 1− ρ)ˆ nt−1 + ρ
³
αˆ θt +ˆ ut
´
, (10)
where ¯ X denotes the steady-state value of Xt.N o t et h a tˆ ut is predetermined at time t. Combining
(9) and (10),
ˆ nt =( 1− ρ − ρη)ˆ nt−1 + αρˆ θt = ρuˆ nt−1 + αρˆ θt, (11)
where ρu ≡ 1 − ρ − ρη =( 1− ρ)(1 − ρ ¯ N/¯ u).
To hire workers, wholesale ﬁrms must post vacancies. Given free entry, the value of a vacancy
is zero in equilibrium. This so-called job posting condition implies that the expected value of a
ﬁlled job will equal the cost of posting a vacancy, or
qtJt = κ,
where Jt is the value of a ﬁlled job, qt is the probability a ﬁrm with a vacancy will ﬁll it, and κ is
the cost of posting a vacancy. The value of a ﬁlled job is also equal to the ﬁrm’s current period
proﬁt plus the discounted value of having a match in the following period. If a job produces




































t is the stochastic discount factor. The left side of (12) is the marginal
product of a worker. The right side is the marginal cost of a worker to the ﬁrm. In the absence of
labor market frictions, this cost would just be the real wage, and one would have Zt/μt = wt,o r
1/μt = wt/Zt; this corresponds to the standard new Keynesian model, where the real marginal cost
variable that drives inﬂation is the real wage divided by labor productivity. With labor market
frictions, additional factors come into play. According to (12), the cost of labor also includes
the search costs associated with hiring (κ/qt) and the discounted recruitment cost savings if an
existing employment match survives into the following period.
The real wage appears in (12). Two approaches have been taken in the literature to determine
the wage. A standard approach allowing for ﬂexible wages is to assume Nash bargaining between
the ﬁrm and the worker. If the bargaining weights are ﬁxed, each participant in the bargain
will receive a ﬁxed share of the total surplus. Shimer (2005) pointed out that the real wage
responds strongly to productivity shocks, leaving unemployment much less volatile than in the
data. In light of the “Shimer puzzle,” many authors have introduced some form of real wage
rigidity (see for example Hall, 2005, Gertler and Trigari, 2007). Since our objective is to develop
a simple framework that parallels the basic new Keynesian model yet incorporates unemployment,
we will follow the literature that assumes Nash bargaining over wages. This choice is consistent
with the assumption of ﬂexible wages underlying the basic new Keynesian model and allows a
straightforward comparison of the policy implications of the two frameworks. We deviate from
the standard assumption of ﬁxed bargaining weights, however, by allowing the division of a match
8surplus to vary stochastically.
Let bt denote the worker’s share of the job surplus in period t. Then the equilibrium real wage
is

















where p is the job-ﬁnding probability of an unemployed worker. Substituting (13) into (12), one





























Given the matching function and noting that qt = mt/vt = χθ
α−1
t and pt = mt/ut = χθ
α
t =
θtqt, (14) and (15) can be linearized around the steady state to express the retail price markup
in terms of labor market tightness as
ˆ μt = zt − ˆ τt = zt − μ
³

















































The linearized expressions for inﬂation and the markup illustrate how labor market tightness
aﬀects inﬂation. A rise in labor market tightness reduces the retail price markup, increasing the
marginal cost of the retail ﬁrms. This leads to a rise in inﬂation. Expected future labor market
tightness also aﬀects current inﬂation. For a given ˆ θt,ar i s ei nEtˆ θt+1 increases the markup and
reduces current inﬂation.5 It does so through its eﬀects on current wages. Expectations of labor
market tightness increase the incentive of ﬁrms to post vacancies. This would normally lead to
a rise in current tightness. However, since the coeﬃcient on Etˆ θt+1 measures the impact on μt
when ˆ θt remains constant, wages must fall to oﬀset the rise in vacancies that would otherwise
occur and keep ˆ θt constant. Finally, there is a cost channel eﬀect in that the real interest rate has
a direct impact on μt and therefore on inﬂation.6 This arises since it is the present discounted
value of expected future labor market conditions that aﬀects the ﬁrm’s decision to post an extra
vacancy.
5In our baseline calibration discussed below, a2 < 0.
6The cost channel in our model depends on the real rate of interest. In standard analyses of the cost channel,
it is the nominal rate of interest that aﬀects real marginal cost. See Ravenna and Walsh (2006).
92.3 The linear approximation
The linearized model is given by (2), (5), (7), (9), (10), (17) and (16). These equations jointly
determine ˆ ct, πt, ˆ nt, ˆ ut, ˆ vt, ˆ μt, ˆ θt,a n dit once a speciﬁcation of policy is added to determine
the nominal rate of interest it. An appendix, available from the authors, shows how these seven
equations can be reduced to a system of two equilibrium conditions that correspond to the new
Keynesian expectational IS curve and Phillips curves but expressed in terms of unemployment
and inﬂation rather than in terms of an output gap and inﬂation. These two relationships are













(1 − ρz)zt (18)
and





[a2β (Etˆ ut+2 − ρuˆ ut+1) − a1 (ˆ ut+1 − ρuˆ ut)]
























In a standard new Keynesian model, the Euler condition is forward looking, containing no
lagged endogenous variables. It has become standard to assume habit persistence on the part
of households so that lagged output appears in the Euler condition. In our model, ˆ ut,w h i c hi s
predetermined at time t, appears because the real search costs associated with vacancies, and
therefore equilibrium production, are aﬀected by the number of job seekers, consisting of workers
who enter the period without matches or are displaced from existing matches. This leads to
the presence of a backward-looking component in the IS relationship without the introduction of
habit persistence. As shown below, in section 3, when the steady-state equilibrium is eﬃcient,
the weights on Etˆ ut+2 and ˆ ut in (18) are each approximately one-half.7
Equation (19) is the new Keynesian Phillips curve in the presence of labor market search fric-
tions. An increase in unemployment (job seekers) lowers real marginal cost and reduces inﬂation.
Just as greater labor market tightness in the future reduced the current cost of labor, a fall in
future unemployment (an increase in labor market tightness) will lower current inﬂation through
its eﬀect on current real marginal cost.
As is well understood, in a standard new Keynesian model, the absence of explicit interest
rate objectives in the loss function means that the IS relationship does not impose any constraints
on the central bank. Thus, optimal policy is only constrained by the Phillips curve. In the search
friction new Keynesian model the optimal policy problem cannot be equally simpliﬁed, since the
real interest rate appears directly in the Phillips curve. However, a form that even more closely
parallels the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve can be obtained by using (18) to eliminate
the real interest rate from (19). Making this substitution would expresses inﬂation as a function
7The weights are β/(1 + β) and 1/(1 + β) respectively.
10of expected future inﬂation and expected future, current, and lagged unemployment rates:
































3T h e e ﬃcient equilibrium




















When prices are ﬂexible, μt = μ>1 for all t. However, a tax-subsidy policy that oﬀsets the
allocative eﬀects of the steady-state markup is not suﬃcient to ensure that the resulting ﬂex-price
equilibrium is eﬃcient as is the case in the standard new Keynesian model. Ineﬃcient job posting
can lead to an ineﬃcient level of vacancies and unemployment. Eﬃciency requires μt = μ =1
and bt =1− α. This second condition is the familiar the Hosios condition for eﬃcient vacancy
creation.8 L e t t i n gas u p e r s c r i p te denote the eﬃcient equilibrium, the job posting condition takes
the form













































t = −αρηˆ zt, (21)
where re
t is the equilibrium real interest rate in the eﬃcient equilibrium.


































(1 − ρz)ˆ zt. (22)
where δ2 =( 1−ρ)
¡
κ¯ V/ α¯ U
¢¡
α − 1+¯ U/ρ¯ N
¢
. .T h er e s p o n s e so ft h ee ﬃcient unemployment rate
ˆ ue
t+1 and the real interest rate in the face of productivity shocks can be found by jointly solving
(21) and (22).9
To investigate how ˆ ue moves in response to a productivity shock, we employ a calibrated
8The Hosios condition requres that labor’s share of the surplus, b, equal the elasticity of matches with respect
to unemployment, 1 − α.
9In (22), we have followed Neiss and Nelson (2003) in deﬁning ˆ ue
t+1 relative to last-period’s eﬃcient unem-
ployment rate. Thus, the path of ˆ ue
t+i is that for an economy that has always been in an eﬃcient equilibrium.
Alternatively, Woodford (2003) deﬁnes the ﬂex-price and eﬃcient equilibria conditional on the actual outcomes in
the previous period. In that case, ˆ ue
t+1 would depend on ˆ ut. Edge (2003) discusses these two alternative deﬁni-
tions in the context of a model in which the lagged capital stock is an endogenous state variable. We follow the
Neiss-Nelson deﬁnition; as Edge shows, it proves more convenient for deriving the welfare approximation we use
to characterize optimal monetary policy.
11version of the model. We parameterize the model to standard values in the literature. The
baseline values for the model parameters are given in Table 1. We impose the Hosios condition by
setting b =1− α. By calibrating the steady-state job ﬁnding probability q and the replacement
ratio φ ≡ wu/w directly, we use steady-state conditions to solve for the job posting cost κ and
the wage w.10 Given the parameters in Table 1, the remaining parameters and the steady-state
values needed to obtain the log-linear approximation can be calculated.
Equations (21) and (22) imply that the equilibrium unemployment responds to productivity
shocks even under ﬂexible prices. Figure 2 illustrates the impulse response of the eﬃcient level of
unemployment and labor market tightness to a one-unit productivity innovation. The solid lines
shows the response when the shock is serially uncorrelated, while the dashed lines are constructed
for ρz =0 .8. Since our calibration imposes the Hosios condition, ˆ ue corresponds to the eﬃcient
deviation of unemployment from its steady-state value. As the ﬁgure shows, positive productivity
lowers unemployment. It also causes a jump in vacancies that signiﬁcantly increases labor market
tightness. The rise in vacancies leads to a drop in the unemployment rate over time. Since the
productivity increase is temporary, unemployment returns to its initial level. When ρz =0 , labor
market tightness returns almost immediately to its steady-state value.
Even when the underlying shock is serially uncorrelated, however, unemployment takes about a
year to return to its steady-state value. As expected, the response of ﬂexible-price unemployment
is both larger and more persistent when the productivity shock is highly serially correlated.
The dependence of ue on productivity contrasts with the implications of the BG model, which
is set up so that the natural rate of unemployment is constant. A key challenge faced by central
banks is distinguishing between eﬃcient and ineﬃcient movements in unemployment in response
to exogenous shocks. While we maintain the standard assumption that the state variables are
known to the policy maker, we see as an advantage of our framework is its explicit incorporation
of time-variation in the eﬃcient rate of unemployment.
4 Optimal monetary policy
To study optimal monetary policy, we assume the monetary authority’s objective is to maximize
the expected present discounted value of the utility of the representative household. A rich and
insightful literature has developed from the initial contributions of Rotemberg and Woodford
(1996) and Woodford (2003) employing policy objectives based on a second order approximation
to the welfare of the representative agent. As is well known, the appropriate welfare approximation
depends on the exact structure of the model. In this section, we discuss the quadratic objective
function that arises in our model with sticky prices and labor market frictions.
While we focus on optimal policies, it is worth noting that, as Kurozumi and Van Zandwedge
(2008) demonstrate, the conditions that simple policy rules must satisfy to ensure determinacy
and E-stability in a labor search model can be quite diﬀerent from the standard Taylor principle.
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and these two equations can be jointly solved for κ and w.T h ev a l u eo fwu is then given by φw.
12Using a model very similar to the one we employ in this paper and in Ravenna and Walsh (2008a),
Kurozumi and Van Zandwedge show that the role of the real interest rate in aﬀecting vacancy
creation plays a critical role in aﬀecting determinacy. A rise in the real interest rate in response to a
rise in expected future inﬂation lowers current vacancy creation, but it also generates expectations
of a tighter labor market in the future when demand recovers. This vacancy channel of a higher
real interest rate creates expectations of higher future inﬂation and so the initial rise in expected
inﬂation can be self-fulﬁlling.11
4.1 The quadratic approximation to welfare
In analyzing optimal policy, it will be useful to introduce some “gap” variables — variable expressed
relative to their stochastic, eﬃcient equilibrium counterparts. Let ˜ xt ≡ ˆ xt − ˆ xe
t.E x p r e s s e d i n















where t.i.p. denotes terms independent of policy, the period-loss function is
Lt = π2
t + λ0˜ c2
t + λ1˜ θ
2
t, (23)
where λ0 = σ(δ/ε) and λ1 =( 1− α)(δ/ε)(κ¯ V/¯ C). Details are given in an appendix available
from the authors. It is important to note that the weight on ˜ c2
t is the same as obtained in a
standard new Keynesian model once it is recognized that our implicit elasticity of hours with
respect to the wage is zero.12
To understand this loss function, recall that the utility of the household depends on total
consumption of market produced goods and home produced consumption. In a standard new
Keynesian model, utility also depends on the disutility of labor, but with constant returns to
scale, labor is proportional to wholesale output which in turn is equal to consumption, up to ﬁrst
order. Utility is reduced by ineﬃcient volatility of consumption, yet inﬂation also reduces utility
because it leads to an ineﬃcient composition of consumption for a given level of wholesale output,
due to the dispersion of relative prices inﬂation generates. That is, even if total consumption is
equal to the eﬃcient level, up to ﬁrst order, the composition of consumption across individual
g o o d si si n e ﬃcient in the presence of inﬂation.
In our model, this distortion arising from inﬂation is also present. Therefore, as in the new
Keynesian model welfare is decreasing in inﬂation volatility: staggered price adjustment means
that inﬂation causes ineﬃcient dispersion of relative prices across the retail ﬁrms. However, in
the present model, total consumption is the sum of market produced consumption and home
produced consumption. Even if inﬂation is zero, so that market consumption is obtained through
an eﬃcient combination of the diﬀerentiated market goods, the composition of total consumption
between market goods and home production can be ineﬃcient if labor market tightness diﬀers
11Llosa and Tuesta (2006) ﬁnd the presence of a cost channel of the type analyzed in Ravenna and Walsh (2006)
also has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on the conditions for determinacy.
12In a basic new Keynesian model, the relative weight on the output gap in the loss function is, in terms of the
present notation, δ(σ + η)/(1 + ηε)ε,w h e r eη is the inverse of the wage-elasticity of labor supply (see Woodford
2003 or Walsh 2003, p. 555). If η =0 ,o n eo b t a i n sσδ/ε, which is the value of λ0 in (23).
13from it eﬃcient value. Hence, even if inﬂation and the consumption gaps are zero, the household
is ineﬃciently combining home and market consumption whenever the tightness gap is nonzero.
This implies welfare depends on the volatility of labor market tightness, represented by the term
λ1˜ θ
2
t. Any deviation of labor market tightness from its eﬃcient level causes welfare losses.
This result does not hinge on our particular speciﬁcation of home production, but simply on
the fact that an alternative way of generating utility is available to unemployed agents, and this
alternative does not suﬀer from the search friction necessary to produce matches and market
consumption. In our setup, this activity implies that a portion of total consumption can be
obtained without the use of the search technology; the result would carry through in a setup
where unemployed workers consume only market-produced goods but also generate utility from
leisure hours.
The intuition can be explained as follows. In a standard new Keynesian model with Walrasian
labor markets we can write the instantaneous utility Ut in terms of a single variable, for example
Nt, using the standard market clearing conditions:

















the Taylor expansion of the utility function, volatility in the price dispersion term ∆
−1
t leads
to a quadratic term in inﬂation in Lt. It describes the wedge between ﬂuctuations in Y w
t and
ﬂuctuations in Ct. With a separable utility function, the wholesale output term, AtNt,i se q u a lt o
consumption up to ﬁrst order, and the disutility of the output and labor term are proportional in
the Taylor expansion, and can be summed together. These terms, in deviation from their eﬃcient
level, result in the quadratic output gap term in the period loss function. It would be possible in
the standard new Keynesian model to rewrite the quadratic approximation to the utility function
in terms of a quadratic inﬂation term, consumption gap term, and a labor (hours) gap term.
However, the labor market term in (23) does not correspond to the labor gap term in a
standard new Keynesian model. Instead, it arises because of the existence of search frictions. In
our setup, we can write
Ut = U(Ct)
= U(Cm
t ,(1 − Nt)wu)
= U(∆
−1
t AtNt − κvt,(1 − Nt)wu)





t AtNt = Cm
t +κvt. In the standard new
Keynesian model, the Taylor expansion has a term in Nt because the loss of utility from getting
an extra unit of Ct is nonlinear in Nt. Our model assumes that the loss from getting an extra
unit of market consumption Cm
t , for given search cost κvt and price dispersion ∆t, is linear in Nt.
That is, moving a worker from the home to the market production sector yields a proportional
change in the argument of the utility function, Ct, and volatility in Nt does not result in an
additional quadratic term in Lt once the consumption term is included in the loss function. The
quadratic labor market tightness term derives from the wedge between ﬂuctuations in Yt and
14ﬂuctuations in Cm
t ,s i n c eYt − Cm
t = κvt. This wedge (and its deviation from the eﬃcient level)
is not proportional to Nt,or Cm
t , since the optimal choice of vacancies depends on labor market
tightness, and (11) makes clear that the same level of market tightness can be consistent with
diﬀerent levels of employment. Similar to the standard new Keynesian model, where the impact
of price stickiness on the allocation can be disaggregated into ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in labor and
ineﬃcient relative price dispersion, the impact of the search friction can be disaggregated into
ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in labor and ineﬃcient allocation of resources devoted to search.
The weight to place on the ˜ θ gap relative to consumption-gap volatility is equal to (1−α)κ¯ V/¯ C.
Rewriting this as (1−α)
¡ ¯ Cm/ ¯ C
¢¡
κ¯ V/¯ Cm¢
shows that as vacancy costs associated with producing
market consumption rise or market consumption’s share of total consumption rises, the welfare
costs of θ-gap ﬂuctuations increases. From the matching function, 1 − α is the elasticity of the
value of a ﬁlled job with respect to θ.T h u s , i f 1 − α is large, volatility in the ˜ θ-gap generates
large ﬂuctuations in the value of jobs, and this translates into large and ineﬃcient movements in
vacancies.
Given the constant-returns-to-scale matching function, the eﬃciency condition for job posting
depends on labor market tightness rather than on either the level of vacancies or unemployment
separately. If the ﬁscal authority employes a subsidy-tax policy that eliminates the distortion
due to imperfect competition in the retail goods market, and if we calibrate the Nash bargaining
parameter b so that it is constant and equal to 1 − α, the matching process satisﬁes the Hosios
condition. In this case, unemployment variability in the ﬂexible-price equilibrium is eﬃcient.
Hence, optimal policy should, conditional on the other policy objectives, attempt to keep labor
market tightness equal to its eﬃcient level by closing the ˜ θ gap.
In a similar model, Thomas (2008) derives a second order approximation to the utility of the
representative agent composed of two terms: the ﬁrst one is quadratic in inﬂation, and is propor-
tional to the loss from price dispersion, while the second one is made up of squares of a number
of endogenous variables’, including consumption, employment, and labor market tightness. This
second term cannot be written in terms of variables measuring gaps relative to the eﬃcient equi-
librium, so it does not provide a way to disaggregate the ineﬃciency created by the search and
nominal rigidity distortions. In contrast, our approximation expresses the loss function in terms
of ineﬃciency gaps that the policymaker would want to minimize.
Search generates ineﬃcient movements in aggregate consumption; therefore it aﬀects the equi-
librium movements of the consumption gap by changing the transmission mechanism, but not the
weight on the consumption gap in the loss function. However, search also generates an ineﬃcient
composition of aggregate consumption, which is why, conditional on consumption, it results in an
additional objective in the loss function.
Writing the loss function in terms of gaps provides the weights that the policymaker should
attach to each eﬃciency gap, or to each distortion in the economy. Thomas’ (2008) objective
function results in a weight for the price dispersion ineﬃciency, but the weights attached to other
variables do not measure any ineﬃciency.
In any model with a search labor market, the search ineﬃciency stems from ineﬃcient ﬂuctu-
ations of the surplus share assigned to each party. Our approach does not take a stand on the
sources of these ﬂuctuations, and assumes they are exogenous. Other micro-founded policy objec-
tive function make stronger assumptions on the source of the ineﬃciency by modeling explicitly
15deviations of the wage and of the surplus share from the eﬃcient equilibrium. Thomas (2008),
for example, assumes staggered wage adjustment for both new and incumbent workers. Clearly,
we could replicate any endogenous wage sequence generated by a productivity shock by building
an appropriate sequence of bt shocks. The optimal policy would, however, diﬀer under our spec-
iﬁcations, since the wage deviations in our model are unexpected by the private sector. Given
the ongoing debate on the most appropriate way to describe wage setting, and the ambiguous
evidence on wage rigidity for new hires (Haefke et al., 2007), our approach provides a reasonable
and useful benchmark.
T h ec o m p a r i s o nb e t w e e nt h el o s sf u n c t i o nw e obtain and the one in BG becomes clear once
we rewrite the loss (23) as follows. Since ˜ ut+1 = ρu˜ ut − αρη˜ θt and it can be shown that ˜ ct =
¡
δ2 ¯ N/η¯ C
¢
(β˜ ut+1 − ˜ ut),
Lt = π2
t + ¯ λ0 (β˜ ut+1 − ˜ ut)
2 + ¯ λ1 (˜ ut+1 − ρu˜ ut)
2 , (24)
where ¯ λ0 = σ(δ/ε)
¡
δ2 ¯ N/η¯ C
¢2 and ¯ λ1 = λ1(1/αρη)2 =( 1− α)(δ/ε)(κ¯ V/¯ C)(1/αρη)2.S e t t i n g
˜ θt+i =0for all i ≥ 0 will, if the initial unemployment gap is zero, ensure that future unemployment
rate gaps also remain equal to zero. keeping ˜ ut+i =0for all i ≥ 0 also ensures that ˜ ct+i =0 .
Current marginal cost depends on ˜ θt and Et˜ θt+1, so keeping the labor tightness gap equal to zero
in current and future periods would also ensure a zero inﬂation rate. However, if ˜ ut 6=0 ,t h e nt h e
central bank must trade-oﬀ eﬃcient labor market tightness against volatility in the unemployment
gap. With our baseline calibration, λ1 ≈ 0,r e ﬂecting in part the fact that vacancy costs are small
relative to total output. In fact, if we assume terms of the form (κ¯ V/¯ N)ˆ xtˆ yt are third order, then
the loss function for a second-order approximation to welfare would take the form
π2
t + λ0˜ c2
t (25)
and involve only inﬂation and the consumption gap. BG also assume hiring costs are small,
leading them to drop cross-product terms with hiring costs, so (25) would represent the loss in
our model under assumptions similar to those used by BG. However, when expressing loss in
terms of inﬂation and the unemployment gap as in (24), (1/αρη)
2 is approximately 11 under our
baseline calibrations, so even when λ1 is small, we do not drop this term when we derive optimal
policy.
4.2 Responses under optimal monetary policy












t + ¯ λ0 (β˜ ut+1 − ˜ ut)




subject to the unemployment-based IS and Phillips curves, (18) and (19), which we repeat here
after imposing the conditions for an eﬃcient steady state and subtracting the ﬂex-price equilibrium
conditions to express the constraints on policy in terms of gaps:














a1 [ρuβ (Et˜ ut+2 − ρu˜ ut+1) − (˜ ut+1 − ρu˜ ut)]
+βδa3˜ rt + δBˆ bt. (28)
The productivity shock does not appear in either the objective function or the constraints
of the policy problem. Thus, optimal policy insulates inﬂation and the unemployment gap from
productivity shocks and lets actual unemployment move with the eﬃcient, ﬂexible-price unem-
ployment rate. As in the standard new Keynesian model, the optimal response to a productivity
shock requires strict inﬂation targeting. This result, however, is the consequence of our eﬃcient
Nash bargaining wage-setting assumption. For values of b diﬀerent from 1 − α, a productivity
shock presents the policy maker with a trade-oﬀ between moving the interest rate so as to sta-
bilize inﬂation or moving the interest rate to steer ﬁrms’ incentive to post vacancies towards the
eﬃcient level. Ravenna and Walsh (2008b) examine in detail the implications of this trade-oﬀ for
monetary policy.
Notice that the bargaining shock enters (28) as a cost-push shock since it is associated with
ineﬃcient ﬂuctuations in unemployment. In the absence of ﬂuctuations in the bargaining shares,
monetary policy designed to ensure eﬃcient vacancy posting so that ˜ ut =0for all t also ensures
that inﬂation remains at zero and keeps the unemployment gap (and its change) equal to zero.
When bargaining shares ﬂuctuate, stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing labor market variables
become conﬂicting objectives. Stochastic shifts in the bargaining share presents the central bank
with a trade-oﬀ between stabilizing inﬂation and stabilizing variability in the unemployment gap.
We focus on the optimal timeless perspective form of commitment policy.13 Given a unit
innovation to the bargaining share shock, the dynamic responses of inﬂation, the unemployment
gap, and ˜ θt are shown in ﬁgure 3 for the case of a serially uncorrelated process for ˆ bt (i.e., ρb =0 ).
Figure 4 shows the impulse responses when ρb =0 .8. The rise in labor’s share due to the positive
s h o c kp u s h e su pc o s t sa n dl e a d st oar i s ei ni n ﬂation. It also leads to an ineﬃcient drop in vacancies
and rise in the unemployment gap. Labor market tightness declines. This is the result of both
ad e c r e a s ei nt h ej o bﬁnding probability and an increase in the probability of ﬁlling a vacancy.
The shock to the bargaining share generates a dynamic behavior akin to a cost-push shock in
the new Keynesian model, where output is below the eﬃcient level and inﬂation is positive on
impact. In our model, unemployment rises above the eﬃcient level (the unemployment gap is
positive), implying output is below the ﬂexible-price equilibrium, while inﬂation rises on impact.
The dynamic process of adjustment in the labor market leads to a gradual return of unemployment
to its eﬃcient level.
The top panel of table 2 shows that, under the optimal commitment policy, the welfare costs
of the bargaining shock are small. The marginal gain from moving from the outcomes under the
optimal policy to the complete elimination of the bargaining shocks is equivalent to a steady-state
rise in consumption of 0.022%. We believe the absolute size of the loss should be interpreted the
caution. In our model, the marginal value of employment depends on the added consumption
that can be obtained by moving workers from to the non-market to the market production sector.
The trade-oﬀ between working and not working is apparently similar to the one faced by the
13See Woodford (2003) for a discussion of the distinction between the optimal commitment policy, the optimal
policy under the timeless perspective, and the optimal continuation commitment policy; see also Jensen and
McCallum (forthcoming).
17representative household in a model with Walrasian labor market and an intensive hour margin,
where more consumption results in fewer hours of leisure. The absolute utility level, however, is
not readily comparable across the two modeling frameworks, since in the Walrasian model utility
is usually measured net of the labor eﬀort, rather than as the sum of consumption and leisure
hours utility. In our framework, utility is the sum of market and non-market consumption, and,
given our parameterization, this speciﬁcation leads to a high steady state level of utility.
4.3 The role of the loss function
The welfare-based loss function involves labor market tightness, the consumption gap, as well
as inﬂation. In this section, we investigate the consequences of policies that are optimal for a
mis-speciﬁed objective function. In particular, we consider the welfare costs of designing policies
to minimize an objective function that corresponds to the quadratic loss functions commonly
employed in the literature on optimal monetary policy. We consider two alternatives to the
welfare-based loss function.
The ﬁrst alternative simply drops the ˜ θ
2
t term from the loss function, yielding a loss function
that would more closely parallel policy objectives used in a standard new Keynesian model:
Lnk
t ≡ π2
t + λ0˜ c2
t. (29)
In this case, policy aims to stabilize inﬂation volatility and the volatility of the consumption gap.
We employ the welfare-based value of λ0 since, as noted earlier, this is equal to the same value
that would arise in a standard new Keynesian model in which utility depends linearly on hours
worked. This loss function ignores the ineﬃciencies arising from search costs in the labor market.
A second loss function that has been employed in the literature includes inﬂation and the
unemployment rate gap:
Lu
t (λ) ≡ π2
t + λ˜ u2
t. (30)
Such a loss function has been employed in studies by Orphanides and Williams (2007) and is
also employed by Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008) in a model with search and matching
frictions in the labor market. Because (29) represents an ad-hoc speciﬁcation of policy objectives,
there is no clear way to calibrate the value of λ, the relative weight placed on unemployment
objectives. For our baseline, we set λ so that the standard deviation of the unemployment gap
under commitment is the same when minimizing either (30) or the welfare-based loss function (23).
In this case, λ =0 .003. Sala, Söderström, and Trigari (2008) derive optimal policy for various
values of λ and ﬁnd that a value of 0.0521 matches the standard deviation of unemployment in
their model.14 Therefore, we also report results for λ =0 .0521.
Results when policy is based on minimizing (under commitment) the alternative loss functions
(23), (29), and (30) are reported in table 2. The ﬁrst column of the table reports the percentage
increase in the welfare-based loss function given by (26) when policy minimizes one of the alter-
native loss functions. Minimizing (29), for example, decreases social welfare by 4.42 percent. The
second column expresses the loss due to bargaining shocks in terms of steady-state consumption
14Because they express inﬂation at an annual rate, the actual value of λ they use is 16 × 0.0521 = 0.833.
Orphanides and Williams (2007) employ a weight of 0.25 on unemployment in their analysis.
18loss. This column shows that under the optimal commitment policy that minimizes the welfare
loss, the consumption loss is only 0.022 percent of steady-state consumption.
The responses of inﬂation, the unemployment gap and labor market tightness to a serially
correlated bargaining shock are shown in ﬁgure 5. For comparison, the lines marked by circles give
the impulse responses under the welfare-based optimal commitment policy and are the same as
those shown in ﬁgure 4. The responses are quite similar across the diﬀerent loss functions with the
exception of the unemployment rate gap loss function with the weight based on Sala, Söderström,
and Trigari (2008). This loss function allows a much greater response of inﬂation to the bargaining
shock and, correspondingly, allows much less movement in the labor market variables. The policy
based on the consumption gap loss given by (29) allows the most labor market volatility and
almost completely neutralizes the impact of the bargaining shock on inﬂation. Both the welfare-
based policy and the policy that minimizes (30) with λ =0 .003 produce almost identical impulse
responses in reaction to the bargaining shock.
The bottom three panels of table 2 show that minimizing the expected present value of (29) or
(30) rather than (23) makes very little diﬀerence in terms of the welfare cost, as long as the weight
on the unemployment gap is small. Note that for the standard new Keynesian loss function (29),
the volatility of inﬂation is close to zero; a policy of price stability would deliver a welfare loss
very close to the optimal policy loss. This result does not imply, however, that including search
frictions in the new Keynesian model is irrelevant, since it is well known that the optimal policy
in the absence of search frictions calls for deviations from price stability following a cost push
shock. Rather, and contrary to the standard new Keynesian model, a policy of price stability
performs nearly as well as the optimal commitment policy if cost-push shocks are explained by
random deviations of the labor’s surplus share from the eﬃcient level and ﬁrms face hiring costs.
Conditional on achieving the same volatility of the unemployment gap, minimizing a standard
loss function in inﬂation and the unemployment gap does approximately the same in terms of
welfare as minimizing the welfare-based loss function that incorporates both the labor market
tightness gap and the change in the unemployment gap. However, when λ in (24) is increased from
0.003 to 0.0521, performance deteriorates signiﬁcantly. The loss function increases by 269 percent
relative to the welfare-based optimal policy, and the welfare costs of bargaining shocks expressed
increases from 0.022 percent to 0.080 percent of steady-state consumption); the standard deviation
of inﬂation increases by a factor of almost nine, while the standard deviation of the unemployment
gap falls by one third.
4.4 Discretion versus commitment
The preceding analysis has focused on optimal policy under commitment. In this section, we
brieﬂy compare the response to a bargaining shock when policy is conducted in a discretionary
regime. Results are reported in table 3 which parallels the cases considered in table 2 for optimal
commitment. Several points are worth noting. First, the welfare cost of bargaining shocks under
optimal discretion is about 10.5 percent higher than obtained under the optimal commitment
policy (0.024 percent of steady-state consumption versus 0.022 percent under commitment). This
cost arises primarily from greater volatility of inﬂation under discretion. In fact, labor market
outcomes are quite similar under either commitment or discretion, as shown in ﬁgure 6 which
19compares the impulse responses under the two policies.15 The path of inﬂation diﬀers under
commitment and discretion primarily because of the diﬀer paths followed by expected inﬂation
under the alternative policy regimes. This is illustrated in ﬁgure 7 which decomposes the path of
inﬂation net of the direct eﬀect of the bargaining shock into the contributions of the labor market
variables, expected inﬂation, and the real interest rate cost channel. Finally, under discretion
the policy obtained using the standard new Keynesian model objective function results in an
allocation closer to the commitment case, and generates a higher welfare than the optimal policy.
Comparing the results in tables 2 and 3 show that outcomes are fairly similar under either
commitment or discretion except when policy minimizes a loss function that includes inﬂation
and the unemployment gap with a large weight on unemployment variability. In this case, loss
deteriorates signiﬁcantly relative to policy based on the correct welfare approximation, rising from
0.024 percent of steady-state consumption to 0.444 percent. Discretion also performed much worse
than commitment. Optimal discretion based on (30) with a large weight on unemployment gap
ﬂuctuations results in the welfare-based loss function being almost 2000 percent higher than is
achieved under optimal commitment. The increase in loss occurs because discretion smooths labor
market variables to a much greater degree than is done under commitment, with a corresponding
increase in the volatility of inﬂation. Figure 8 shows that, while the immediate impact of rising
unemployment on inﬂation is larger under discretion than commitment, the labor market returns
to steady state much faster under discretion. As a consequence, expected inﬂation remains higher
under discretion.
4.5 The role of the transmission mechanism
Above we assumed policy was optimal, conditional on the wrong objective. That tells us how
important deviations from the correct objective function are in generating welfare losses relative
to the optimal plan (Ramsey allocation), but such an exercise is silent on the implications of the
consequences if optimal policy is conditional on the wrong constraints - that is, on the wrong
transmission mechanism for policy. In this section, we investigate the performance in our model
of targeting rules that are optimal for the standard new Keynesian model. Since a central bank is
likely to target the wrong objective if its knowledge of the transmission mechanism is inaccurate,
we examine the performance of policy rules that would be optimal conditional on an incorrect
objective function and on an incorrect transmission mechanism. This exercise provides insights
into whether the central bank generates large losses by ignoring the existence of search frictions
and search unemployment.
We consider four alternative policy rules that have been widely employed in standard new
Keyensian models: 1) the optimal targeting rule under commitment from a timeless perspective
— πt = −(λ/δ)(˜ ct − ˜ ct−1) where λ =( σ + ηN)(δ/ε) and ηN =1is the parameterized labor
supply elasticity in a model with separable utility in consumption and labor hours; 2) the optimal
targeting rule under the time-consistent, discretionary policy — πt = −(λ/δ)˜ ct;3 )s t r i c ti n ﬂation
targeting — πt =0 ; and 4) a Taylor rule — it =( 0 .5/4)˜ ct−1 +1.5πt.16 results are reported in table
4.
15Note that the impulse responses for commitment are the same as those shown in ﬁgure 4.
16The coeﬃcient on ˜ ct is divided by four to be consistent with the interest rate and inﬂation rate which, in the
model, are expressed at quarterly rates.
20Implementing the optimal commitment targeting rule from the standard new Keynesian model
leads to a 26 percent increase in the welfare loss (see the ﬁrst column of table 4) relative to the
commitment policy based on minimizing the welfare-based loss function. Interestingly, perfor-
mance is better under discretion that commitment, but this simply reﬂects the fact that when
policy employs the wrong model, there is no presumption that commitment will lead to better
outcomes than discretion. In fact, strict inﬂation targeting outperforms both the commitment
and time-consistent targeting rules. The ﬁnal row of table 4 shows that the Taylor rule does very
poorly, leading to much more inﬂation variability than any of the other policies considered17.
The backward-looking policy rule estimated by Clarida, Gali and Gertler (2000) over the Burns-
Greenspan tenure for the years 1979-1997 leads to an even worse result, generating a welfare loss
equal to 2.45% of steady state consumption.
5 The role of labor market structure
An important advantage of our model is its ability to characterize the optimal policy according to
diﬀerent assumptions about the characteristics of the labor market. For example, Blanchard and
Galí (2008) argue that a separation rate ρ =0 .025 and steady state employment N =0 .9 (which
imply a job-ﬁnding probability p =0 .118) are appropriate for studying the European economy,
rather than the values of ρ =0 .1 and N =0 .95 (which imply p =0 .655) used for a calibration
based on the US. These diﬀerences translate into an expected duration of unemployment of 4.3
months under the US calibration and 12 months under the EU calibration. Another dimension
along which the US and European labor markets diﬀer is the generosity of unemployment beneﬁts.
Nickell (1999) reports an average replacement ratio for EU countries of 0.6 and 0.5 for the U.S.18
It is important to note that the diﬀerences between our US and EU calibrations is restricted to
diﬀerent values of the labor market parameters. Other parameters, including the frequency of
price adjustment, are held constant across the two calibrations.
A convenient way to highlight the diﬀerences between the US and EU calibrations is to use
(27) to eliminate Et˜ ut+2 from (28) yielding19
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However, when evaluated at the eﬃcient steady-state, a2 = a1ρu,a n dw eo b t a i n
πt = βEtπt+1 − a1δ
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(1 − βρu)(1− ρu)
αρη
¸







˜ rt + δBˆ bt. (31)
Equation (31) is isomorphic to a new Keynesian Phillips curve with an unemployment rate gap
replacing an output gap and with a cost channel present, though this latter channel operates
17The Taylor rule is written in terms of lagged, rather than current consumption, to ensure determinacy of
the equilibrium. Kurozumi and van Zandwedge (2008) show that the conditions for determinacy when policy is
expressed as an instrument rule are in fact very diﬀerent from the case of the standard new Keynesian model.
18The duration of unemployment beneﬁts is also shorter in the U.S. than in EU countries, on average.
19This is equivalent to evaluating (20) at the parameter values that ensure the steady state is eﬃcient.
21through the real rate of interest rather than through the nominal rate as in Ravenna and Walsh
(2006).20
The basic inﬂation adjustment equation given by (31) for the two calibrations are
πt = βEtπt+1 − 0.093˜ ut+1 +0 .099˜ rt +0 .080ˆ bt (32)
for the U.S. values and
πt = βEtπt+1 − 0.073˜ ut+1 +0 .942˜ rt +0 .064ˆ bt (33)
for the EU values. Two diﬀerences are apparent. First, the interest rate channel on inﬂation is
much larger in the EU calibration. Second, inﬂation is less sensitive to unemployment under the
EU calibration as compared to the US calibration. In large part, this reﬂects the higher persistence
of unemployment under the EU calibration, for which ρu =0 .796 versus a value of only 0.310
under the US calibration. As seen in (31), the lower degree of persistence reduces the impact of
˜ ut+1 on inﬂation. If ρu is large, both current and future labor market conditions move together,
so the impact of current conditions is oﬀset to some degree by the co-movement of expected future
conditions. In more ﬂexible labor markets, ρu is smaller and current unemployment conditions
induce a smaller co-movement in expected future conditions. Thus, the impact on inﬂation is
larger. The smaller value of ρ in the EU calibration also operates to reduce the impact of ˜ ut+1
on inﬂation for similar reasons.
The higher value of ρu under the EU calibration also accounts for the larger impact of the
real interest rate on inﬂation. Changes in the real interest rate aﬀect the present discounted value
of future labor market tightness. When employment is more persistent, the expected discounted
future labor market conditions have a bigger impact on current inﬂation, so changes in the rate
used to discount the future have a correspondingly larger impact on current inﬂation.
The greater ﬂexibility of the labor market under the US calibration is reﬂected in the responses
of the eﬃcient unemployment rate to a positive, serially correlated productivity shock. This is
shown in ﬁgure 9, which plots both the US response (which was also shown in ﬁgure 2) as a solid
line and the EU response as a dashed line. The peak impact under the US calibration is −0.139
and occurs in the second quarter after the productivity shock. In contrast, the peak eﬀect for the
EU calibration is only −0.077 and this occurs ﬁve quarters after the shock.
Figure 10 plots the responses to a serially correlated shock to labor’s bargaining share for the
20To understand why lagged unemployment does not appear in (31), note that conditional on ˜ rt and ˜ ut+1,t h e
IS relationship (27) implies that ˜ ut +βEt˜ ut+2 must be constant. A higher value of ˜ ut, again conditional on ˜ ut+1,
implies greater labor market tightness ˜ θt, as vacancies must be higher to prevent the higher ˜ ut from leading to a
rise in ˜ ut+1. Greater labor market tightness in period t raises real marginal cost at t and would tend to increase
inﬂa t i o n .B u ta tt h es a m et i m e ,βEt˜ ut+2 must be lower to maintain ˜ ut + βEt˜ ut+2 constant, consistent with the
Euler condition. The fall in βEt˜ ut+2 implies an increase in expected future labor market tightness, and this acts
to lower inﬂation (see 16). The two eﬀects exactly oﬀset leaving inﬂation independent of lagged unemployment.






























where all partial derivatives are conditioned on ˜ ut+1 and ˜ rt being held constant and ∂Et˜ ut+1/∂˜ ut = −1/β from
the IS relationship.
22US and EU calibrations. To allow the two cases to be more easily compared, the middle panel
shows the response of the level of the standard unemployment rate, as steady-state levels diﬀer
under the two calibrations.21 The U.S. calibration leads to more volatile in the inﬂation rate and
the labor market variables. Labor market outcomes are less volatility with the EU calibration, but
the major diﬀerence is the relatively greater stability of inﬂation, with optimal policy in the EU
calibration producing very stable inﬂation. The key parameter change that produces this result
is the reduction in the rate of exogenous job destruction ρ from 0.1 under the U.S. calibration to
0.025 for the EU calibration. To understand this result, consider the limit as ρ → 0.W i t h n o
employment turnover, unemployment is constant, and optimal policy reduces to stabilizing the
inﬂation rate at zero.
Results for alternative loss functions with the EU calibration are given in table 4. Regardless
of the objective function, both inﬂation and the unemployment gap are signiﬁcantly less volatile
when the labor market is less ﬂexible. Comparing the last column of table 4 with the corresponding
column of table 2 shows that the relative decline in inﬂation volatility is greater, however. The
costs of bargaining shocks under the optimal welfare-based commitment policy for the EU case
is less then one-third the cost with the US calibration (0.007 of steady-state consumption versus
0.027).
Outcomes when policy minimizes the standard loss function (29) with λ =0 .0521 are shown
in ﬁgure 11. While inﬂation is much more volatility in this case under both calibrations (compare
scales in ﬁgures 10 and 11), unemployment is stabilized to a greater degree with the U.S. calibra-
tion. The costs of bargaining shocks under ineﬃcient policy is 0.045% of steady-state consumption
for the EU calibration, compared to only 0.007% under the welfare-based optimal policy.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper, we have added to the growing literature incorporating labor market frictions into
models with nominal rigidities. We show how a sticky-price new Keynesian model with a labor
market characterized by search frictions can be reduced to a simple inﬂation-unemployment gap
model that parallels the standard new Keynesian model. By preserving the assumption of real
wage ﬂexibility, our results are directly comparable to models with staggered price adjustment and
Walrasian labor markets with ﬂexible wages that have been prominent in monetary policy analysis.
Our framework allows for a rich characterization of the labor market in terms of exogenous
separation rates, labor bargaining power, matching technology productivity and eﬃciency, and
job posting costs.
We derive a second-order approximation to the welfare of the representative household and
show how it depends on inﬂation and the gap between unemployment and the eﬃcient level of
unemployment. We show that labor market tightness aﬀects welfare, and all the cost from search
ineﬃciency can be summarized in a single term in the welfare function. The appropriate objective
for the policymaker can be expressed solely in terms of inﬂation and what we have labeled the
21We have deﬁned ut to include those not in a match at the end of period t − 1 and those displaced by the
exogenous job destruction process at the start of period t. Under the US calibration, the steady-state value of u
is 0.145, while for the EU calibration it is 0.123.U s i n g1 − Nt as the deﬁnition of unemployment, the US and EU
values are 0.05 and 0.10 respectively. the much higher number of searching workers for the US is a result of the
higher rate of exogenous job destruction.
23unemployment gap. The unemployment gap enters the loss function in two ways. First, loss
depends on the gap between our measure of labor market tightness and the eﬃcient level of
market tightness, and this gap is proportional to a quasi-diﬀerence of the unemployment gap.
Second, welfare depends on consumption volatility and this can also be expressed in terms of
aq u a s i - d i ﬀerence of the unemployment gap. The trade-oﬀ between stabilizing the terms in the
welfare function is the result of random deviations from eﬃcient surplus sharing across ﬁrms and
workers. Our approach does not take a stand on the sources of these ﬂuctuations, and does not
assume any endogenous constraint aﬀecting the wage adjustment, exactly as in the standard new
Keynesian model.
Our results show that including search frictions and unemployment in a model with staggered
price adjustment preserves some of the monetary policy results common to new Keynesian models
(namely, the policy maker’s loss can be expressed as a function of inﬂation and a measure of
real activity, and productivity shocks do not generate a trade-oﬀ but require movements in the
real activity variable). Search frictions in the labor market, beside aﬀecting the goals of the
policy maker, change the monetary transmission mechanism by adding a cost channel along with
the traditional demand channel. In general, the presence of labor market frictions reduces the
diﬀerence between responses under optimal commitment and optimal discretion. Ignoring the role
of labor market frictions in setting the objectives of policy can lead to large losses. In particular,
a policy designed to minimize inﬂation volatility and unemployment gap volatility can produce a
signiﬁcant reduction in welfare if a moderately large weight in placed on unemployment objectives.
If the central bank ignores the impact of labor market frictions in both the objective function and
the propagation mechanism of shocks, and implements the optimal targeting rule derived from
a standard new Keynesian model, outcomes are inferior to those obtained under strict inﬂation
targeting. In fact, the optimal time consistent targeting rule from the basic new Keynesiam model
performs better in the face of labor search frictions than the optimal commitment rule from that
model. We also fund that, if the labor market becomes less ﬂexible, and employment dynamics
more muted in response to random shocks, optimal policy calls for greater inﬂation stability.
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26Table 1: Parameter Values
Exogenous separation rate ρ 0.1
Vacancy elasticity of matches α 0.5
Workers’ share of surplus b 0.5
Replacement ratio φ 0.5
Vacancy ﬁlling rate q 0.7
Labor force N 0.95
Discount factor β 0.99
Relative risk aversion σ 2
Markup μ 1.2
Price adjustment probability 1 − ω 0.25
Table 2: Alternative Policy Objectives
Commitment
Quadratic loss Welfare-based loss
Relative to Opt.
Commitment (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
00 .022 0.22 0.64 10.89 0.34
Std. Loss in ˜ c−gap, λ = λ0
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
4.42 0.023 0.02 0.66 11.37 0.03
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .003
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
0.41 0.022 0.18 0.64 10.99 0.28
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .052
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
268.54 0.080 1.81 0.46 7.69 3.93
∗ Cost of bargaining shocks under optimal commitment policy as percent of steady-state consumption.
Table 3: Alternative Policy Objectives
Discretion
Quadratic loss Welfare-based loss
Relative to Opt. Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
Commit. (%)
10.48 0.024 0.36 0.64 10.99 0.57
Std. Loss in ˜ c−gap, λ = λ0
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
4.39 0.023 0.02 0.66 11.37 0.03
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .003
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
12.60 0.025 0.34 0.65 11.13 0.55
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .052
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
1928.86 0.444 4.52 0.39 6.94 11.47
∗ Cost of bargaining shocks under optimal discretion as percent of steady-state consumption.
27Table 4: Alternative Policies
Baseline NK model optimal commitment policy
Quadratic loss
Relative to Opt. Commit. (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
26.81 0.027 0.33 0.68 15.90 .48
Baseline NK model optimal discretionary policy
Quadratic loss
Relative to Opt. Commit. (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
20.55 0.026 0.21 0.69 16.20 .30
Strict Inﬂation Targeting
Quadratic loss
Relative to Opt. Commit. (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
5.21 0.023 0 0.66 15.60
Taylor Rule: it =( 0 .5/4)e ct−1 +1 .5πt
Quadratic loss
Relative to Opt. Commit. (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
3405.90 0.76 1.49 0.43 10.07 3.46
Estimated policy rule CGG Volker-Greenspan period: it =0 .71it−1 +0 .29[1.72e ct−1 +0 .34πt−1]
Quadratic loss
Relative to Opt. Commit. (%) Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
11420 2.45 2.72 0.38 8.90 7.16
∗ Cost of bargaining shocks under optimal discretion as percent of steady-state consumption.
Table 5: Alternative Policy Objectives: EU Calibration
Welfare-based loss
Loss as % of Opt. Policy Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
Commitment 00 .005 0.04 0.27 6.81 0.16
Discretion 0.45 0.005 0.05 0.27 6.81 0.20
Std. Loss in ˜ c−gap,λ = λ0
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
Commitment 0.61 0.005 0.00 0.27 6.85 0.02
Discretion 0.48 0.005 0.00 0.27 6.85 0.02
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .003
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
Commitment 0.18 0.005 0.03 0.27 6.82 0.12
Discretion 1.12 0.005 0.05 0.27 6.83 0.20
Std. Loss in ˜ u−gap, λ =0 .052
Welfare cost∗ σπ σ˜ u σ˜ θ σπ/σ˜ u
Commitment 94.58 0.010 0.53 0.25 6.33 2.13
Discretion 305.50 0.022 0.90 0.25 6.44 3.65
∗ Cost of bargaining shocks as percent of steady-state consumption under optimal commitment policy













Figure 1: Employment and hours per employee (total private industries, HP detrended, shaded
regions denote NBER recession dates)
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Figure 2: Response of the eﬃcient, ﬂexible-price unemployment rate ˆ ue
t and labor market tightness
ˆ θ
e
t to a 1% positive productivity innovation for diﬀerent values of ρz.





















Figure 3: Response to a one unit bargaining shock under optimal commitment: ρb =0























Figure 4: Response to a one unit bargaining shock under optimal commitment: ρb =0 .8.
















labor market tightness, θ
circles: welfare loss, pluses: u-gap loss, x mark: SST loss, stars: c-gap loss
Figure 5: Impulse responses to a one unit bargaining shock under optimal policies minimizing
diﬀerent loss functions























labor market tightness: commitment
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Figure 6: Responses to a bargaining shock under optimal commitment and discretion



























Figure 7: Contribution of labor market, expected inﬂation, and the real interest rate to the path
of inﬂation net of the direct eﬀect of the bargaining shock when policy is based on the welfare
approximation.



























Figure 8: Contribution of labor market, expected inﬂation, and the real interest rate to the path
of inﬂation net of the direct eﬀect of the bargaining shock when policy is based on the minimizing
the exprected present value of π2
t + λ˜ u2
t and λ =0 .052.












Figure 9: Unemployment rate responses to a serially correlated productivity shock: US and EU
calibrations




























Figure 10: Responses to a unit bargaining shock for U.S. (solid line) and EU (dotted line) cali-
brations. (Note: middle panel shows the rate of unemployment.)




























Figure 11: Responses to a unit bargaining shock for U.S. and EU calibrations when policy mini-
mizes the standard loss function (29) with λ =0 .0521.
34